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Processes that are related to the identification and the
authentication of persons and other legal entities have
been necessarily existing and functioning for a while in
public administration and business. Information Society
offers new e-services for citizens and businesses, which
dramatically change the administration and results in
additional challenges, risks and opportunities. Citizen’s
confidence and trust in services has to be improved,
meanwhile several requirements, like personal data and
privacy protection and legal requirements have to be
satisfied. The usual business process of identification
of the corresponding entity is generally based on some
trivial control mechanism, typically password identifica-
tion. In order to keep the trust of the public in the public
administration activities, the process for entity identifi-
cation (both person and legal entity) should be amended,
taking in account the business and security consideration.
Identity management solutions show intriguing variation
of approaches in Europe, they are at a different maturity
level of services.
Our paper gives an overview about the most frequently
cited identity management architectures (namely: Lib-
erty Alliance Architecture, Sibboleth, Government Gate-
way Model and Austrian Model) and presents an identity
management framework (based on the PKI, but im-
proved it), customized for the Hungarian specialities,
which offer possibilities to improve the related services
quality.
We give an overview about the decisive identity manage-
ment approaches and we suggest an identity management
framework (based on the PKI, but improved it), pro-
posed as a general solution. The concrete example as
a case study demonstrates a solution customized for
the Hungarian specialities. Our paper shows a solu-
tion for the improvement of the identity management
in e-government processes through the development of
security mechanisms making use of the readily available
technologies. The improved business and technol-
ogy processes are demonstrated through the Hungarian
solution to the problem as a case study.
Keywords: Public Key Infrastructure, e-government, se-
curity, digital signature, e-ID, smart card
1. Introduction
Tasks related to identification and authentica-
tion of persons and other entities have been a
significant part of general business processes
in public administration and business life. In-
formation Society offers new e-services for citi-
zens and businesses, which dramatically change
the public administration, and at the same time,
bring about additional challenges, risks and op-
portunities. Citizen’s confidence and trust in
services has to be enhanced, meanwhile several
requirements, like data protection, privacy and
legal requirements have to be satisfied. The tra-
ditional methods being in use now are neither
secure nor comfortable. Amongst other, these
are the reasons that explain identity manage-
ment popularity. Several research projects are
addressing identity management-related issues,
like Guide [4], Prime [11]. PKI architecture
can be one of the suitable candidates to enhance
the level of security, meanwhile compliant with
additional users needs.
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The PKI architecture provides services that are
rooted in the available IT technologies. The ser-
vices implicate business process, directly or in-
directly. The existing business processes should
be aligned with the services of PKI that en-
force some business and IT architecture and ap-
proaches for making use of technology. How-
ever, the basic issues, namely concepts related to
identity management: the identification, certifi-
cation, authentication of persons, and moreover
the business processes involved in the previ-
ouslymentioned activities own an interpretation
in common sense that is not bound by the con-
straints and limits of technology. Regarding the
whole bunch of business processes associated
to PKI, we should investigate the requirements
for process improvement, the opportunities for
enhancing the currently existing business and
software processes.
The challenge is that even if the more mod-
ern PKI technology is used, PKI itself cannot
guarantee the authentication and authorization
of the identity at the level that is anticipated by
the public administration. Both business pro-
cess side and the supporting IT technology for
e-government services should be re-engineered;
the available technology solutions should be
complemented with appropriate parts.
The basic problem that should be solved some-
how is the following: in the relationship be-
tween the citizen and the public administration,
there is a very strong requirement for mutual
verification and validation of the identities of
partners, usually prescribed by the law, by the
legal environment and by the jurisdiction. The
most important Hungarian regulation approach
can be found inKet (CXL.Law, 2004). Ket cov-
ers the regulation about the way how to handle
the linking of government to citizen (G2C) and
vice versa, furthermore it codifies the rules for
e-government processes and procedures. It is
applied as a legal framework for business pro-
cesses, procedures and standards within Hun-
garian public administration. Regarding the
available technologies, there are several oppor-
tunities to implement a proper technical solu-
tion. However, a technically satisfying solution
could collide with the legislation environment
and jurisdiction. In some countries, the law
permits a de facto central register of electronic
identity of citizens; in other countries, either the
laws in force or the practice of jurisdiction pro-
hibits centralization of the registered electronic
identities, and allows only some kind of dis-
tributed solution. The technology should pro-
vide services even in distributed or federated
cases thereby the partners — the public admin-
istration and citizen — could build up a trust
relationship mutually. The identity of citizen
proved by a certification of PKI technology and
issued by a commercial organization— the Cer-
tification Authority — could not be regarded
convincing enough for the public administra-
tion. The certification contains some kind of
name or names, but it does not have enough
information for unambiguous authentication.
Our paper gives an overview about the deci-
sive identity management approaches and we
present an identitymanagement framework (ba-
sed on the PKI, but improved it), proposed as
a general solution. The concrete example as a
case study demonstrates a solution customized
for the Hungarian specialities.
The outlined approach provides a solution among
the constraints raised by the legal environment
and the available technology, and avoiding some
pitfalls that apparently yield a resolution but it
hides some traps because disregarding the basic
principles of cryptography. The solution is at
higher security level than the traditional ones,
and it even develops further the available PKI
technology approaches providing improvement
in the business process and supporting technol-
ogy related processes and the applied software
environment.
2. The Opportunities for the Improvement
of Identity Management in an
e-Government Environment
Within a corporate environment, identity man-
agement is dealing with managing the type of
information, which is available for a certain ap-
plication [7]. It involves maintaining a person’s
complete information set, spanning multiple
transactions and contexts. Identitymanagement
application is part of an end-to-end security so-
lution and addresses the needs for certainty in
the areas of authentication, access control and
usermanagement [5]. Identitymanagement sys-
tems allow people to define different identities,
roles, associate personal data to it, and decide
about access control of them and when to act
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anonymously. An identity management system
would empower the user to maintain their pri-
vacy and control their digital identity [7]. The
next business drivers of identity management
are cited in the literature [5]:
• Cost reduction (unsatisfactory management
of identity can increase the cost (e.g. waiting
for permissions, etc.)).
• Increased security (inadequate access rights
can be an additional risk for an organiza-
tion).
• Increased compliance (an identity manage-
ment system can help the organization to
comply with laws (e.g. data protection laws)
and regulatory environment).
• Increased usability (users are able to control
their working environment and customize
it).
• Infrastructure consolidation and application
development speed (solutions can be built
more rapidly, with applying reusable secu-
rity elements).
Two major areas are distinguished in identity
management; namely, enabling user access (au-
thorization, authentication, etc.) and user life
cycle management (user administration, provi-
sioning, etc.). Another view is user’s perspec-
tive (focus on efficiency (one single sign-on
to many applications)) vs. administrator per-
spective (focus on efficiency of management)
aspect. Major building blocks of identity man-
agement are the enterprise directory services,
authentication, access control, and user man-
agement (ITGI, 2004). Four elements manage
the whole life cycle of the identity within an
organization, from creation to termination.
• The enterprise directory service consists of
two major components:
• Directory services database that operates
as a hub data store for identity and au-
thentication information.
• Meta-directory: Its major functional ser-
vice is to share identity-specific data,
to carry out data synchronization among
various directories, databases and appli-
cations within an organization.
Authentication is the procedure that checks the
identity of a user so that he or she may have the
right to use some resources and the access rights
can be granted or denied correctly. The aim of
access control is to guarantee that users are
provided access only to those applications or
resources they are permitted to use it some way.
User management as IT function is responsi-
ble for providing user identities across multiple
applications or systems.
Most important requirements against identity
management are functional services and privacy
[7]. Another important aspect which has to be
emphasized is personal data and privacy protec-
tion. For the e-government services, the identity
management solution elaborated in the past that
are in use within corporate environment must
have been, in principle, a perfect technological
solution. However, several pre-conditions for a
full–fledged application should be satisfied.
The foundation of basic technological architec-
ture for the identitymanagement is laid in Public
Key Infrastructure. The basic principle is that
the subject of identity management owns a key-
pair: a public key and a private key. Even if the
subject jealously guards his/her private key and
publishes his/her public key, it is impossible to
prove that the published key really belongs to
the person who claimed it as his own. For this
problem, a trusted business process was needed
that “permanently” links the owner’s identity to
the public key. Thereby, a trust hierarchy came
into life. The point of trust would bind public
key to an identity (and maybe other personal
information) on behalf of the owner of the key-
pair. Everybody could then accept the single
point of trust as a reliable authority that links
the end-entity (person or legal entity) identity
to the key-pair and the certificate that contains
information about the owner and the public key.
The degree of validation at a reliable trust point,
at CertificationAuthority (CA), can be reflected
using extra information embedded into certifi-
cates: typically validation takes place at the
level of e-mail address, in a corporate envi-
ronment against the Human Resource directory,
face-to-face meeting with additional checking
of official credentials (passport, personal identi-
fication document, driving license, social secu-
rity data, tax authority’s identification number
etc.)
However, even if the strongest authentication
method is used for validation, the published
information either in a certificate database or
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in the owner certificate represents only a small
part of data that would be interesting, required
by and significant for the partner who would
like to identify the owner of the certificate and
to verify. Generally, the certificate contains an
e-mail address, a personal name, maybe some
other names, and the public key. The certificate
database that is publicly available may provide
access only to the personal name, and down-
loading the certificate containing the public key,
nothing less. Nevertheless, it may seem sur-
prising that so little data are available for iden-
tification, but the anxiety for privacy and the
attacks manifested during the past years justi-
fies this practice. Based on agent and artificial
intelligence technology, several soft bots (“soft-
ware robot”)were created to collect information
from public Web sites as e.g. directory services
for using the acquired e-mail addresses for gen-
erating spams, unsolicited e-mails. The only
escape route is to avoid capturing of e-mail ad-
dresses by this easy way and against the owner
original intention is using “captcha” like e-mail
addresses. To protect the other personal data,
the only solution is not to publish at all on pub-
licly available Web sites, directory services.
The Certification Authority may have a paper
or electronic database that contains the data
that were checked during the validation pro-
cess. The personal data and privacy protection
acts in EU and the member states support this
practice. However, the public administration in
an e-government process needs much more in-
formation for an accurate identification of the
owner of a certificate and a key-pair. Putting it
simply, the question for the public administra-
tion is: among the several John Doe who is the
right one?
The direct access to the database of personal in-
formation stored at the Certification Authorities
raises security questions. If the public admin-
istration can retrieve data from this protected
database, then anyone could do it. The previous
issue leads to the common identity management
processes:
1. There must be a functional capability for in-
dividuals to authenticate themselveswith ap-
plications.
2. When identity data is passed from one coun-
try to another, it is likely that data conver-
sions will have to be applied. This could
be done by semantic integration and meta-
directory services. As an example, last
names of persons in Ireland stored in a di-
rectory should be mapped to last names of
persons in Spain in the appropriate directory,
and vice versa. To avoid interfering with
principle of subsidiarity, these services are
likely to operate on the basis of a common
data model with mappings of this common
data model to and from the data models of
each single member state.
3. There should be some function of the direc-
tory service that retrieves the addresses or
links of those services that want to interact
with each other. A local authentication ser-
vice may have to redirect an authentication
request to the authentication service being
cognizant.
4. Finally, legislationmay require the existence
of logging and notification services.
The problem can be formulated in the following
way: the public administration requires a strong
identification and authenticationmechanism for
its partners, in spite of the personal data and pri-
vacy protection obligation of government. How
can we improve the business process for identity
management for the purpose of e-government?
Approaches of IdM architectures show hetero-
geneous picture, we discuss briefly only the
most frequently cited ones, namely: Liberty
Alliance Architecture, Sibboleth, Government
Gateway Model and Austrian Model, in order
to compare them with the Hungarian approach.
2.1. Liberty Alliance Architecture
Liberty Alliance [13], a consortium represent-
ing organizations from around the world, was
created in 2001 to address the technical, busi-
ness, and policy challenges around identity and
identity-based web services. The goal of Lib-
erty Alliance is to enable consumers, citizens,
businesses and government’s online transac-
tions applying open standards while protecting
the privacy and security of identity information.
All kinds of identities are linked by federation
and protected by universal strong authentica-
tion, are being built with Liberty’s open iden-
tity standards, business and deployment guide-
lines and best practices for managing privacy.
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It offers the technology, knowledge and certi-
fications to build identity into the foundation
of mobile and web-based communications and
transactions. Liberty Alliance Architecture is
widely applied and cited in the area of identity
management. The following part of the section
provides a brief overview of the Liberty Al-
liance’s federated network identitymanagement
architecture’s components and themain features
of the components. A high-level overview of
Liberty Alliance Architecture modules can be















Figure 1. High-level overview of the Liberty Alliance
Architecture.
Main modules are the following:
• Liberty Identity Federation Framework
(ID-FF)
• Identity Services Interface Specifications
(ID-SIS)
• Liberty Identity Web Services Framework
(ID-WSF).
Liberty Identity Federation Framework empow-
ers identity federation and management through
features such as identity/account linkage, sim-
plified sign on, and simple sessionmanagement.
The Liberty ID-FF module supports the feder-
ation of identities, including the corresponding
management. This framework enables the in-
teroperability of the most varied platforms and
defines the federation for PCs and mobile de-
vices (mobile phones, PDAs etc.). With ID-FF,
the user has access to Single-Sign-On in his/her
personal CoT (“Circle of Trust”). The ID-FF
module also defines the exchange of metadata.
The ID-FF module is the central module of the
Liberty specifications.
Identity Services Interface Specifications is based
on ID-WSF and contains specifications for the
following functions: user registration, address
book, calendar, location-specific services, and
alarms (“alerts”). Liberty Identity Services In-
terface Specifications (ID-SIS) enables inter-
operable identity services such as contact book
service, geo-location service, presence service,
personal identity profile service, and so on.
Liberty Identity Web Services Framework (ID-
WSF) provides the framework for building in-
teroperable identity services, identity service
description and discovery, permission-based at-
tribute sharing, and the associated security pro-
files. ID-WSF, Identity Web Services Frame-
work, is based on ID-FF and forms the basis to
provide personified services. ID-WSF includes:
• the exchange of individual attributes (“per-
mission-based attribute sharing”),
• the collection of identity elements in a dis-
tributed environment (“identity service dis-
covery”)
• interaction services (“interaction services”)
additional security profiles, which are to be
observed during data exchange (“security
profiles”)
• “Simple Object Access Protocol Binding”
(SOAP binding)
• “extended client support” (extended support
for end devices, not IP/HTTP specific)
• “Identity services templates” (personality pro-
files specification).
Underlying part of the architecture – extension
of industrial standards represents a collection of
international standards relevant to Liberty. ID-
FF, ID-WSF and ID-SIS are based on these stan-
dards. These refer to existing standards; as nec-
essary and when required, they will be extended
and approved with the appropriate standardisa-
tion organisations. Liberty Alliance works to-
gether with many organisations; some of them
are:
• Organisation for the Advancement of Struc-
tured Information Standards (OASIS)
• World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
• Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
The following are used as standards: SAML,
HTTP, WS-Security, WSDL, XML-ENC, WAP,
XML, SSL/TLS, SOAP, and XML-DSIG.
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2.2. Government Gateway Model
The goals of the model were to make all Gov-
ernment services accessible on-line by 2005,
provide universal access to the Internet and en-
sure the UK is the best place in the world for
e-commerce [4]. Government Gateway is the
common channel linking the public with gov-
ernment systems viaWeb sites,government por-
tals and Internet-enabled applications. It is de-
signed not only to benefit government and pub-
lic sector departments, but also three million
UK businesses and 60 million citizens. Main
features of the gateway model are the follow-
ing:
• Aims to centralise authentication of citizens
and businesses
• Heavy PKI origins - costly and complex for
users, low take-up
• Looking to ease user registration and in-
crease take-up
• Have registration & enrolment process.
Government Gateway provides a secure, easy-
to-use means for people and businesses to enrol
for services and file forms including income tax
and value-added tax returns. Anyone able to
use a Web browser can access the system, and it
is easy for the Government to operate, manage
and maintain. When launched, the UK online
e-government initiative faced challenges in ad-
dition to connecting a huge number of users.
It had to integrate a single access path, serv-
ing all users, with departmental IT infrastruc-
tures that had operated independently for many
years. The role of theGovernmentGateway is to
provide departmental systems with an outward-
looking perspective, responsive to the needs of
individual citizens and businesses of every size
and type.
2.3. Austrian Model
By the Austrian e-government strategy, the un-
ambiguous and secure identification of citizens/
businesses and administration units as commu-
nication partners is a decisive factor implement-
ing e-government services. Therefore elec-
tronic signatures – in some sensitive cases se-
cure or “qualified” (by the EU directive notion)
electronic signatures – are required for commu-
nication to public administration.
The Austrian government has got a software
application developed for a middleware – it is
called Security-Capsule – which is the link be-
tween different signature tokens (smart cards,
USB-Tokens, mobile phones) and the various
e-government applications.
The sectors of public administration that of-
fer smart cards (e.g. Social Security Author-
ity, Passport Office, Banks, teaching institu-
tions), can integrate this software into their e-
government related services and converting the
smart cards or tokens issued by particular sec-
tors of public administration to official citizen
cards, which can be used in all e-government
processes.
In the Austrian approach, the use of smart card
and PKI technology is intertwined in an insep-
arable way. The smart card or token can be
any type of their genre, assuming that it is suit-
able for storing a digital signature certification.
This principle makes allowance for using the
smart cards/tokens issued by various sectors
of the Austrian government as e.g. the Social
Security, National Health Service and by other
governments of EU member states to use uni-
form way. For the use of the smart card/token
in relationship with the Austrian public admin-
istration, a specific registration procedure is re-
quired. During a registration procedure on the
smart card token, two key pairs are stored (A-
key-pair for “secure or qualified” signature and
B-Key-pair for an advanced digital signature),
and, furthermore, a person identifying data tu-
ple. The data tuple consists of a unique identi-
fier of the person (“Basic Concept”), the public
key of the digital signature on the smart card,
public key of B-Key-pair, the “valid through”
data and the whole tuple is signed by the proper
authority. The tuple on the smart card will be
used as a person binding, i.e. a one-to-one and
unambiguous mapping between the person and
the smart card that ensures that only the owner
of the smart card and having the knowledge of
the password to the smart card can act on the
behalf of the particular person. In principle,
the sector specific identifier within the public
administration differs in each sector of public
administration as the procedure for generating
it makes use of the basic concept, the character
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string as the denomination of the certain sector
of public administration.
During the procedure, these data is fed as in-
put to a hash function — that does not have
an inverse function — constructing the required
identifier. In this way, the person is identified
in any official procedure by the person binding
and his/her digital signature on the document.
The authority can unambiguously identify and
authenticate the person through this informa-
tion. There is a well-elaborated mechanism for
a trusted hierarchy assigning the legal respon-
sibility to another person or legal entity to act
on behalf of the person in official procedures of
e-government services.
The communication between the person as a
client in the sense of IT and the e-government
services takes place in a secure format using
proper protocols as SSL, TSL. In each official
procedure, there is a front-end for security con-
trol, the so called Security Entrance, that pro-
vides the necessary checking for the following
information item as the digital signature, client
credentials, identity checking through the per-
son binding transmitted, deducting the procedure-
specific-identifier for the particular official pro-
cedure; and, if necessary, the assignment hier-
archy for legal responsibility.
At the interface of an e-government service
provider, the identification mechanism uses a
cryptographically safe SSL communication tun-
nel. Initialising the SSL connection, the public
key of the smart card is used to build a data
block for authentication. Thereby, at the same
time, the client, the browser and the person are
authenticated, and made unnecessary to exploit
the User-ID and password, assuming that the in-
tegrity of the card in the sense of cryptography
is ensured.
At the basis of the Austrian e-government work-
flow are XML-forms provided by online appli-
cations via a central portal, which can easily be
displayed by the web browser. If preferred by
the user, some fields on the form can be filled in
automatically because of the Security-capsule
which stores personal information of the card-
holder (e.g. name, birth date, ID-number). The
data for the remaining fields needs to be pro-
vided by the citizen. If necessary, attachments
like birth certificate or electronic payment con-
firmations can be added. Upon completion of
the form, the Security-capsule requests the citi-
zen to sign with the citizen card. After the entry
of a PIN number, the complete form is delivered
to the back office application. When the back-
office process is concluded, the administrational
notification will be electronically signed by the
authority, encrypted with the citizen’s public
key and delivered to the citizen’s electronic de-
livery service. Comparison of the above de-
scribed IdM approaches is demonstrated in the
Table 1.
2.4. Shibboleth
Shibboleth is an Internet2/MACE project de-
veloping architectures, policy structures, practi-
cal technologies and an open source implemen-
tation to support inter-institutional sharing of
web resourceswith access control requirements.
It uses SAML as an underlying technology. The
Shibboleth project also created OpenSAML, an
open source implementation of the SAML spec-
ification. Shibboleth is a federated approach to
attribute sharing. It enables resource sites to
request attributes about a visiting user from the
users’ origin site. The origin site must know its
users and be able to authenticate them. These
attributes can then be securely transferred to the
resource site. It is up to the user to specifywhich
information can be released about the user and
to which site. It is possible that resource sites
only receive a small set of attributes about a
given user (e.g. the location) and do not get to
know which particular user it is, and thus Shib-
boleth is seen as a privacy enabling technology.
Shibboleth is aiming to solve the needs that uni-
versities typically have, but it is not restricted
to that domain in its use and application. It has
the potential to be used much more widely as a
single-on or privacy enhancing technology.
3. Service Requirements against PKI
Infrastructure Enforced by Business
Processes of e-Goverment
There are several requirements against the iden-
tity management and electronic signatures that
cannot be satisfied with the recently available
technology, however the common sense and the
normal business logic seems to anticipate as a
requisite of the service set to be provided.
















































Supported N/A Supported Supported Supported
SSO
(Single Sign-On) yes yes yes yes yes
Digital Traceability No N/A Weak
No (In principal,
but there is opportunity
for surprise attack)
No
Table 1. Comparison of the IdM Approaches.
Identification of the owner — (the end entity,
EE) — of a digital certificate does not cause
problem in a closed business world or in a rel-
atively narrow trust community, where the per-
sonal details and the content of the digital cer-
tificate can be mapped to each other with little
effort. Nevertheless, the e-commerce and the
public administration of a nation (e.g. tax sys-
tem) oblige the unambiguousmapping the iden-
tity of the cyber entity embodied by the digital
certificate and the end entity as it exists in the
business life, the real world and in the relation-
ships with the public administration.
Basic elements of PKI architecture are the Reg-
istration Authority and the Certification Au-
thority. These two components are exactly
mapped to two disparate software constituents
of the IT architecture that are typically licensed
separately. The explanation is that the underly-
ing organizational architecture and the IT solu-
tion are strongly coupled to each other.
Thereby, in a PKI environment, there is an RA
(Registration Authority). The end entity sub-
mits its details through RA to the Certification
Authority (CA). The RA performs some checks
on the validity of the supplied data, and then
the RA gets a unique identifier code and the
public key written in the certificate instead of
the user-specific information. The data stored
within the end entity’s certificate are supplied
by CA through a secure channel to the RA. The
end entity possesses its private keys that are
tied to the public key contained in the certifi-
cate; the ownership of the key-pair by the end
entity cannot be questioned rightfully. The PKI
system, the CA and RA together ensure that the
user-specific details are publicly not available
and accessible, and not even published in the
certificate. However, the CA is able to provide
verification information about the identity of the
end entity, and some details of data of EE for
an enquirer supplying e.g. the unique identifier
code from within the certificate.
The queries raised by an enquirer could seem
as if “someone presented an end entity certifi-
cate containing the following unique identifier
and/or public key, and claiming, in an attached
piece of information, to be John Doe; or claim-
ing their postal address is No. 1 Any Street, in
Anytown — is this true?” The enquirer can
be a business partner, an agent or client repre-
senting public administration, and has the right
to request directly from the end entity further
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piece of information, moreover makes use of
their own databases containing legally stored,
not public information about the end entity. The
agent can match the information coming from
different sources namely, the CA/RA, its own
databases and the end entity. The available data
can be matched, verified and validated algorith-
mically proving or disproving the identity of
the end entity. This solution can be named as
“Identity background checking”,
A closely related issue is the management of
the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The val-
idation service in a PKI environment is very
similar to the very early credit card companies’
solutionswhereby a list of cancelled cards—for
whatever reason — was regularly distributed to
the business partners. The burden of checking
and controlling that an issued digital certificate
is used rightfully, conforming to the intended
policy, regulation and specific authorization is
on the recipient (the relying party). The re-
cipient should check whether the user’s trusted
status has been revoked by the issuing CA or
not. The issuing CA regularly creates a CRL
that identifies its revoked certificates (regard-
less of their possessing valid expiry dates, at-
tributes and signatures). A CRL is dated, and
then signed, by the issuing CA to show its au-
thenticity and is issued perhaps on an hourly, or
daily basis. The CRL has a fixed validity period
as well.
The recipient, the relying party uses the logi-
cal decision “IF a certificate is not included in
the CRL THEN it is OK”. This logical infer-
ence uses ‘the negation as failure’ or ‘the closed
world assumption’ that is well-known in the log-
ics of mathematics and computer science/infor-
matics, and legally applicable when no other
reliable information source is available. For
security reason, the only correct logical conclu-
sion that can be drawn is “IF certificate is listed
in the CRL THEN it is NOT OK”.
There is some technological solution, but be-
cause of the lack of the accepted business model
and the mutually beneficiary financial solution,
some extra technological burden should be un-
dertaken, the solutions are not very widespread.
The on-line certificate status protocol (OCSP)
allows certificates status to be validated in real
time. The content of the answer is generally
constrained legally to “YES” or “NO”. CRL to
be advertised, there is no need for the appli-
cation of “the negation as failure” logic. The
content of the answer is generally constrained
legally to “YES” or “NO”.
The simple Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP) is a similar approach to OCSP, but it
permits for the relying party to get rid of much
of the certificate chain checking work and pass
it to the SCVP responder. Responses could be
more than “YES” or “NO” if it is legally accept-
able to provide more detailed information about
the user/certificate owner who has elicited the
query on the side of the enquirer.
Based on the requirement analysis described
above and illustrated using the QFD approach
(Quality Function Deployment) in Figure 2, the
conclusion can be drawn that the viable and fea-
sible solution regarding the state-of-the-art of
PKI is the identity background check that could
be implemented in a reasonable time-frame and
could fit into the public administration and cur-
rently available PKI framework.
4. The PKI Technology as a Viable Tool
for e-Government — Arguments for
the Solution Selected for the
e-Government in Hungary
For political and economic reasons, there is a
strong pressure to implement more and more
public administration services using informa-
tion technology appearing as e-government ser-
vices.
The remote access to the e-government services
makes it necessary that the citizen should iden-
tify and authenticate itself by a reliable and se-
cure manner that ensures mutual trust for both
public administration and the citizen. However,
we have to talk about client or end entity instead
of citizen as not only natural persons but other
legal entities may have contact with the public
administration.
In the commercial world and within single orga-
nizations, the PKI technology developed during
the last decades has achieved success. How-
ever, the PKI technology has accomplished only
modest success in the relationship between client
and public administration in the form of e-
government. In the various form of contact
between the clients and government, there is
a very critical and significant difference to the
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Figure 2. QFD for requirement analysis of the technical solution for identification approaches.
use of PKI by enterprises, especially the inter-
nal utilization of PKI for the secure and reli-
able communication and business management
among the staff of the organization.
The definite difference is the privacy and pro-
tection of personal data. A person can be identi-
fied unambiguously or with high probability by
using some natural bits of information as e.g.
the given name, second name, date and place
of birth, mother’s maiden name, and home ad-
dress. There are some identification numbers
or character strings used within certain sectors
of public administrations as tax number, social
insurance number, personal identification num-
ber, etc. Although these unambiguous and easy-
to-handle identifiers cannot be used together be-
cause of the legal environment in some countries
and jurisdiction, they cannot be stored in the
same data store and cannot be linked to each
other. With slight differences, this statement is
valid largely for the member countries of EU.
Within a certain organization for internal use,
the content of digital certificates and data related
to the person owning the certificate does not
create conflict regarding the privacy issue. The
digital certificates and the other data are pub-
lished in a public data store; in a directory that
is typically realized by the LDAP (Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol), technology could
be accessed and read by other members of the
organization. The typical data that occur in
this context are the e-mail address, the personal
names, titles, job description, department name,
telephone numbers, etc. The access to this type
of data for other members of the organization
is very important for business reasons, to sup-
port the workflow and business processes. For
general public, to publish only restricted set of
the before-mentioned data set has been crushed
by the spam. The appearance of other personal
data on public LDAP servers would hurt more
or less the privacy of persons, naturally depend-
ing on the local jurisdiction. To make this point
clear, some legal rules for the public adminis-
tration in Hungary consider the name and offi-
cial telephone of civil servants as a public data.
Whether the e-mail address is personal or pub-
lic data depends on the uniqueness and depen-
dence on the individuality of person, maybe the
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e-mail provided for official use is public data,
but other e-mail addresses should be considered
as personal data. The debate on this topic is
continually carried on, and still has not been
concluded.
If a citizen as a client of the public administra-
tion acquires a digital certificate from one of the
commercial certification authorities (CA) for
managing his/her own business with the public
administration then the public directory of the
certification authoritywill not contain other data
as the name of the citizen and digital certificate
containing the public key. Moreover, the di-
rectory (e.g. LDAP technology directory) may
hold an e-mail address that is strictly coupled to
the digital certificate. Optionally, the directory
record may include the name of organization,
department/business unit, country code, iden-
tification number/serial number, name of city
or town may appear as public information. But
the publication of these data is a little bit risky
because of privacy issues, unless the person has
given permission for the publication. The pub-
lic key and the serial number of the certifica-
tion at a particular CA can be considered as
an unambiguous, unique identifier of a person.
For identification and authentication, these data
seem to be perfect, from both view points of the
public administration and information technol-
ogy. Though, what does the public key identify?
The popular view is that the person is identified.
The question is which person is identified. Us-
ing public key included in the certificate, only
the name and maybe the e-mail address of the
person are public. What is the process that can
identify unambiguously the person on the side
of the public administration in this situation?
Because, generally, the available information is
not sufficient for the unambiguous identifica-
tion as the names (given name, second name,
etc.) are not unique. The e-mail address is
unique but there is no mechanism to map the
e-mail address onto a person. The alternatives
for public administration are the following:
1. The public administration creates a central
database of e-mail addresses and couples
them to certain persons.
2. The public administration creates a central
database of public keys and links to certain
persons.
3. The public administration uses the exist-
ing central databases of tax numbers, so-
cial insurance numbers and personal iden-
tification numbers. A person is unambigu-
ously mapped onto the identifier in each sin-
gle database. The identifier and public key
should be linked together in each database.
Disregarding the Big Brother approach that the
state collects all personal data, one of the lawful
solutions is a voluntary registration mechanism
when the person and his/her public key within
the digital certificate are linked together. The
major task is to find a registration, certifica-
tion, identification and authentication mecha-
nism which conforms to the international (EU)
directives and national laws and regulations.
Several countries in the EU have a central reg-
istry of citizens in the form of databases and
their permanent and maybe temporal address.
The tax offices, the social insurance agencies
have similar databases containing the identifier
that is specific to the sector, moreover several
items of the personal data suitable for identify-
ing the person and considered as a natural identi-
fier. There is a temptation to use these databases
to support the identification and authentication
within each sector of public administration in-
volved in the e-government using PKI technol-
ogy. It seems a feasible approach to join the
public key of a person’s certificate and iden-
tifier specific to a particular sector of public
administration. Arguing that “the public key”
is public — nomen est omen — and there is
no hurting the privacy of a person by this way.
However, there is a serious logical fault in this
argument. Through the public key of a per-
son’s certificate all the separate and insulated
databases could be joined together by a prim-
itive algorithm without any serious effort. All
the activities related to the public administra-
tion of a single person could be tracked easily,
and the data collection about a person would be-
come trivial. In EUgenerally and in themember
states especially, this solution is strictly prohib-
ited by the law and the practice of jurisdiction.
A following problem area is to support the com-
mercial certification authority by creating mar-
ket for their services. At the same time, the
state, the EU member state should remain neu-
tral considering the competition on the market
ensuring market opportunity for the commer-
cial organization. All the efforts to introduce
the PKI technology to ease the tasks associated
to the e-government concentrates on the reso-
lution of above outlined conflict. The various
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Figure 3. Communication lines among the participating partners of mutually trusted e-government service points
(numbers denote the order of the communication).
national models try to find an appropriate solu-
tion that satisfies both the technology and the
legal environment.
5. The Hungarian Solution that Improves
both the Service and the Security Level
of e-Government Processes and
Ensuring Privacy
In Hungary, the Gordian knot of the above men-
tioned problem is sliced to in the following
ways:
1. The request for a certificate enclosing a dig-
ital signature and the registration with con-
forming rigorous Certification Policy (CP)
at a commercial Certification Authority that
enables the certification holder to do busi-
ness with government through e-government
services. Avoidance of centralisation of per-
sonal data is automatically guaranteed and
designates a movement towards a federated
PKI architecture.
2. At a single CA, the person’s naturally identi-
fying data is stored a secure database beside
the certificate and the public data that will be
published in a directory. The certificate con-
tains an indicator that signals the appropri-
ateness for public administration, to handle
issues through e-government services. The
identifiers specific to certain sectors of pub-
lic administration (tax number, social insur-
ance number, etc.) are not stored either in
the certificate or in the personal registration
database, not even some coded format that
might be created by a cryptographic algo-
rithm or a hash function.
3. The CA-s should own by the Force of Law
a so-called CRL site. At this site, the CA
should provide specific services that for an
identification request from public adminis-
tration answers by a “Yes” or “No”. The
CA receives a data package including the
naturally identifying data of a person, public
key and/or the serial number of the certifi-
cate. The service carries out a check on the
database, retrieves information and unifies
to the provided data. If there is a match the
answer is “Yes”, in all other cases the answer
is “No”.
4. During an interaction with public adminis-
tration, a citizen can identify and try to get
himself authenticated by a certificate enclos-
ing a digital signature. The e-government
service of a specific sector during the in-
teraction requests the sector particular iden-
tifier (tax number, social insurance num-
ber), the public key of the digital signature,
and some naturally identifying data. The
e-government service — based on the gath-
ered data — calls for an answer from the
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certificate issuer CA and performs an in-
ternal check on its own internal database.
After gaining an answer which is satisfying
and fitting to the available data from both re-
sources, i.e. internal and external, the person
is authenticated, moreover authorised to ex-
ecute transactions through the e-government
service.
The above description conforms to the legal
environment in Hungary embodied in the Act
about the Processes of Public Administration
(by the Hungarian legal acronym, Ket (CXL.
Law, 2004)). The registration Authority is re-
cently with The Credentials Offices run by lo-
cal government. The Credentials Offices issue
driving licences, personal identity cards and the
electronic identifiers for “Client Gateway” of
e-government in Hungary. The Credentials Of-
fices create digital certificates for digital signa-
ture and electronic identity for those who re-
quest one. The basic principle in Hungary is
the “opt in”, i.e. the electronic identity — for a
while — is not compulsory but optional. Now,
it seems that two logical types for electronic
identities and separate smart cards will be in
operation in the near future in Hungary. There
will be one for general personal identification
and one for Health Insurance.
The Credentials Offices are linked to the Cen-
tral Registration Office for People and Ad-
dresses on-line for sending the identification
data and the checking happens in batch pro-
cessing at the Central Registration Office.
6. Conclusion
The original aim of PKI technology was to pro-
vide services regarding identification, authenti-
cation and authorisation for e-commerce and for
enterprises’ internal IT infrastructure. Within
the e-commerce, the PKI technology would
have enabled that any contract would be un-
repudiated and before the court it could have
been enforced, it would have been especially
important in the copyright-related products and
commercial artefacts. Nevertheless, the various
pre-payment method, bank card solutions, and
direct transfer between the bank accounts elec-
tronically, furthermore the enhanced security of
before-mentioned type of transactions played
down the urgent need for application of digital
signature and the related technology in practice.
Together with the developed logistics of Post
services, the e-commerce was able to increase
its volume without the extensive proliferation of
digital signature and PKI infrastructure.
For internal use of PKI within enterprises has
got an impetus. The market leaders of software
manufacturers on the office, document handling
and e-mail technology have built in their product
the major element of PKI technology as e.g. lo-
cal Certification Authority, issuing certificates
of digital signatures and identification, e-mail
systems integrated with LDAP technology for
storing the person’s data. There are no legal
problems with this approach as the publica-
tion of personal data happens within a restricted
and closed community. The PKI technology in
such an environment serves well the interests
of enterprise workflow management, operates
smoothly together with other software applica-
tions and, at the same time, ensures a secure,
reliable and trusted IT environment.
On the other hand, the public administration
faces lots of legal issues as the circle that may
want to do business with it is not closed, it could
be rather regarded open. The procedures of
public administration obey to strict regulations,
laws and other legal rules, for this reason the e-
government service should find the narrow path
between the legal opportunities and solutions
provided by the PKI technology. The public
administration is between Scylla and Charyb-
dis.
The Austrian approach for utilizing the PKI in-
frastructure and the smart card technology for
the e-government services is fairly sound. How-
ever, there are two minor faults.
The first one is that the whole procedure starts
from a centrally stored identifying number, nat-
urally there is a strong attempt using cryp-
tographic methods to eliminate any trail that
would help to reconstruct the original data.
Though, the starting point is a central state reg-
ister anyway, and this idea is not satisfying in
several countries and jurisdiction regarding the
personal data and privacy protection, privacy
laws and regulations. The objections that are
raised are worth considering in the light of 9/11
and afterwards the attempts for restricting the
civil rights and extending the power of national
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security forces on the activities of data collec-
tion about persons even by liberal governments
and jurisdiction.
The second one is more technical, namely the
use of hash function for information protection.
The original purpose of the hash function was
to ensure the integrity of the data message, not
for protecting the data from algorithmic attack.
As the famous attack for password recovering in
the UNIX systems demonstrates —the so called
dictionary attack — if the structure and space
message is known and constrained, the attack
could be successful. The success depends only
on the computing power uses up. The procedure
to create the person binding and the sector spe-
cific identifier uses a hash function in the case of
Austrian e-government. The data used as start-
ing point and their structure are well known and
publicized. Theoretically, there is a chance for
surprise attack as there is no rigorousmathemat-
ical proof for the security of the hash function
applied, and the hash function is used for other
purposes as it was designed enhancing the po-
tential threat and vulnerability of the method.
The Hungarian approach avoids several pitfalls.
1. There is no central registration of citizens
acquiring certificates for either qualified or
advanced digital signature.
2. The registration process does not use any
sector specific identifier of the Hungarian
public administration at the commercial Cer-
tification Authority. The central register of
citizens and addresses could be queried by
the person’s naturally identifying data, and
the central register responds only by a “yes”
or “no”, thereby supplying an enforcement
of the authenticity of the transmitted data.
The personal data, identifier stored in the
central register do not play any role generat-
ing the certificate, the digital signature and
the personalization of a token (smart card,
USB token, etc.)
3. The certification issued by the commercial
Certification Authority contains sufficient
information for interfaces and automated soft-
ware solutions at the various sectors of the
Hungarian Public Administration to carry
out the procedure for authentication and val-
idation of the certificate of digital signature
and other supplied and retrieved data from
the databases of the particular sector of gov-
ernment. For example, the URL of Certi-
fication Authority where the data exchange
could be performed.
4. The applied cryptographic procedures re-
lated to thePKI technology are thewidespread,
technically sophisticated, sound and accord-
ing to the state of the art are reliable and
resistant to the known algorithmic attack.
TheHungarian solution is technically sound and
conforms to the legal environments without any
compromise, for this reason it is worth consid-
ering to push the international proliferation of
this approach.
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